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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EDUCATIONAL LAND
GRANTS AND MISSISSIPPI STATE PROPERTY
INTERESTS UNDER REVIEW IN PAPASAN v. ALLAIN
INTRODUCTION
From the Enabling Act of Ohio in 1803 to that of Alaska in 1959,
Congress conveyed to the states public land for educational purposes.
The Enabling Acts provided that certain sections in each township be
reserved for educational purposes. These land grants created a significant
income source for the establishment and maintenance of state run public
schools. The states are responsible for disbursing the revenues derived
from the federal land grants to the state schools. Although Congress
conveyed the lands to the states, the states' authority to distribute revenues
may be limited by the language of the Enabling Act or by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution.
In Papasan v. Allain,' school children and school officials of the Chick-
asaw Cession counties filed suit against the state of Mississippi claiming
that the state and state officials were breaching the federal school land
trust. The claim stated that such breaches violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by disproportionately allocating
among school districts state resources for the support of local schools.2
There is no dispute that the school districts within the Chickasaw Cession
counties receive significantly less educational land grant funds per capita
than other state counties. However, there is dispute over whether the
disparities in funding from educational land grants detrimentally affect
the schools within the Chickasaw Cession counties and whether the state
has any choice in determining how to allocate such funds. The state's
discretion to allocate land grant funds depends on the property interest
in school land that the United States conveyed to Mississippi upon admis-
sion to the Union.
Papasan v. Allain illustrates the significance and the difficulty of inter-
I. 478 U.S., 106 S.Ct. 2932 (1986) [hereinafter Papasan fl].
2. The petitioners also "alleged a denial of due process, unconstitutional impairment of contractual
obligations, a taking without just compensation, and a Ninth Amendment Claim." Papasan H1, 106
S.Ct. at 2938 n. 8; Joint App. at 15-23, Papasan II (No. 85-499). Of these additional claims, only
the Contract Clause claim was pursued in the case before the United States Supreme Court. The
Court held that the Contract Clause claim was "in all essential respects the same as the petitioners'
trust claim" and therefore the Eleventh Amendment similarly barred that claim. Papasan 11, 106
S.Ct. at 2938 n. 8.
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preting federal land grants. This is the first case to challenge the consti-
tutionality of the land grants themselves. Although the United States
Supreme Court did not decide this issue, the Court raised the question
of whether the federal grants require the state to allocate educational land
grant funds to the schools in the townships in which the lands are located,
and if so, whether the federal grants violate the Equal Protection Clause.
The United States Supreme Court remanded this issue to the Fifth Circuit
and directed the court of appeals to review the federal grants to determine
the property interests transferred to Mississippi.'
On remand, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit must determine
whether the disparity in benefits received by Mississippi school districts
from Sixteenth Section lands is "rationally related to a legitimate state
interest." 4 This determination depends on whether the federal grant requires
Mississippi to allocate the economic benefits of Sixteenth Section lands
to the particular district in which those lands are located.5 If the federal
grant requires the state to allocate monies to particular townships, then
Mississippi's disbursement procedures are rationally related to a legiti-
mate state interest. However, the federal grant itself may violate the
Equal Protection Clause by requiring the state to disproportionately dis-
tribute school land grant funds among school districts.7 If the federal
grant violates the clause, Mississippi may be enjoined from disbursing
educational benefits received from Sixteenth Section lands to the particular
districts in which those lands are located.8
This note addresses the issue of what interests in educational reserved
lands the United States conveyed to Mississippi upon its admission into
the Union. First, this note briefly discusses the history of educational
land grants in the United States, with particular emphasis on Mississippi.
Second, this note discusses various interpretations of the Mississippi land
grants and the possible ramifications of each of the interpretations that
may be adopted by the appellate court on remand.
SUMMARY OF THE CASE
In 1981, school officials and school children of the twenty-three north-
ern Mississippi counties, known as the Chickasaw Cession counties, sued
the state of Mississippi alleging a breach of trust by the state and a denial
3. Papasan iI, 106 S.0. at 2946-48. This case was remanded to the court of appeals because
the parties only disputed the legal significance of the factual allegations of the complaint. Id. at
2935 n. 1.
4. Id. at 2946.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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of equal protection. After tracing the history of the Mississippi public
school lands, petitioners challenged the legality of the state's actions,
which resulted in Sixteenth Section lands not being reserved in the Chick-
asaw Cession area. 9 They argued that the disproportionate school lands'
appropriations deprived Chickasaw Cession school children of a "mini-
mally adequate level of education," thereby violating the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The petitioners sought four equitable remedies and money damages.
They asked for (1) a declaration that the Mississippi legislation purporting
to sell the Chickasaw Cession school lands was void and unenforceable;
(2) a declaration that defendants were depriving plaintiffs of property and
educational rights without due process of law or just compensation and
that defendants were depriving them of equal protection of the law; (3)
a grant of substitute lands of the same value as the original Chickasaw
Cession school lands; and (4) an order directing the Mississippi legislature
to establish a suitable compensating perpetual trust fund. The fund would
provide annual income to the Chickasaw Cession school districts in an
amount equivalent to the level of income which they could have reason-
ably expected to enjoy had Mississippi not sold the Sixteenth Section
school lieu lands.'" The petitioners also sought damages for lost income
due to the state's imprudent trust management and compensation for any
future denials of their rights to due process and equal protection."
The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), holding that the Eleventh
Amendment and the Statute of Limitations barred petitioners' claims.' 2
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed since the relief requested
was compensation or restitution for past wrongs and, therefore, an imper-
missible monetary award against the state treasury.'3
The court of appeals found, however, that an appropriate alternative
remedy was available and therefore did not summarily dismiss the com-
plaint. It held that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar the petitioners'
claim based on the present disparity in school funding. 4 Since the court
9. Id. at 2938.
10. Id.; Joint App. at 28-29.
11. Joint App. at 28-29.
12. Id. The District Court's order dismissing the complaint with prejudice is unpublished. Plain-
tiff's Brief on the Merits at 1.
13. The district court's decision is discussed in the appellate court decision, Papasan v. United
States. 756 F.2d 1087 (5th Cir. 1985) [hereinafter Papasan I.].
14, Id. The Court of Appeals stated that the Eleventh Amendment barred a federal court from
awarding retroactive "monetary relief from the state in the form of compensatory damages, punitive
damages, or monetary awards in the nature of equitable restitution .... "Id. at 1093, quoting Clay
v. Texas Women's University, 728 F.2d 714, 715 (5th Cir. 1984) (emphasis added by the Papasan
I/ Court).
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found no necessary connection between the amount of money expended
for educational purposes and the quality of education, the state's unequal
distribution of school land funds did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause. 5 Relying on San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodri-
guez, 6 the appellate court also reasoned that the funding disparity between
the Chickasaw Cession counties and other counties did not deny plaintiffs
equal protection because there was a rational basis for the difference in
the disbursement structure of Mississippi's school finances.' 7 Income
differences inevitably exist among school districts because of variances
in land values and desired local administration of local property taxes for
educational funding. Income differences in the Chickasaw Cession school
districts were caused by the state's sale of the school lands and investments
of the proceeds in the Mississippi railroads that were subsequently destroyed
in the Civil War. Mississippi consequently attempted to remedy its bad
investment by annual appropriations to the Chickasaw Cession counties.
Although the state failed to adequately remedy the consequences of its
poor investments in the railroad companies by failing to adjust appro-
priations to keep up with inflation, the state did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause. The court said the state was obligated only to attempt
a remedy, not to achieve complete success."
On certiorari,"9 a divided United States Supreme Court affirmed that
the Eleventh Amendment barred the petitioners' breach-of-trust claim.2"
The Court also affirmed that the complaint's equal protection claim was
not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.2' The Supreme Court, however,
15. Papasan 1, 756 F.2d at 1095.
16. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
17. Papasan 1, 756 F.2d at 1095. In Rodriguez, the Court used a rational basis test. The Court
rejected use of heightened scrutiny since it found that the Texas school financing system did not
discriminate against any suspect class nor violate any fundamental right. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at
28, 37. The Court stated that education is "not among the rights afforded explicit protection under
our Federal Constitution." Id. at 35. The Court also found that questions of local taxation, fiscal
and educational planning, and, in this case, federalism, required the traditional standard of review,
that is, that the state's system bear some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes. Id. at 40-
44.
18. Id..
19. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Papasan H, 106 S. Ct. 521 (1986).
20. Papasan /, 106 S. Ct. at 2934. Justice White wrote the opinion of the Court, joined by
Justice O'Connor. Justices Burger, Powell, and Rehnquist concurred with the majority's holdings
that the Eleventh Amendment barred the petitioners' breach-of-trust claim but did not bar the Equal
Protection claim. However, they dissented from the majority's holding that petitioners' claim may
violate the Equal Protection Clause under a Rodriguez rational basis test. Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens concurred with the majority's holding that the complaint stated an Equal
Protection claim sufficient to withstand a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and that the
case had to be remanded to the court of appeals for further proceedings. They concurred in the result
of the majority's holding that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar the Equal Protection claim but
dissented to the holding that the Eleventh Amendment barred the petitioners' breach-of-trust claim.
21. Papasan /, 106 S.Ct. at 2947. The Court stated that the "essence of the equal protection
allegation is the present disparity in the distribution of the benefits of state-held assets and not the
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rejected the appellate court's understanding of the petitioners' claim. The
Supreme Court found that the complaint did not challenge Mississippi's
overall public school financing system, but was restricted to disparities
of Sixteenth Section and lieu land funding.22 Thus, the Court distinguished
Rodriguez and remanded the case to the court of appeals to address the
equal protection issue.
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF EDUCATIONAL LAND GRANTS
Educational land grants have been an integral and favored policy of
the American federalist system. 3 Beginning with the Land Ordinance of
1785,24 the Congress of the Confederation made provisions for the res-
ervation of Sixteenth Section lands for educational purposes.25 The-
Northwest Ordinance of 1787 provided for the division of the Northwest
Territory into states.26 In the Enabling Act of the Territory of Ohio, the
first territory to apply for statehood, Congress provided that section num-
ber sixteen in every township be reserved for the use of schools.27 This
past actions of the State." Id. at 2942. The Court characterized the unequal distribution as the type
of continuing violation for which a prospective injunctive remedy is permissible under Ex Parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
22. Papasan II, 106 S.Ct. at 2945.
23. The educational land-grant policy of the federal government follows the New England colonial
educational land endowment system of the seventeenth century. The colonial government started
several colleges, such as Harvard, William and Mary, Yale, Dartmouth, and Princeton, with land
grants or proceeds from the sale of lands. The principle of appropriating land for educational purposes
was approved on the grounds of religious freedom and democracy. See H. HIBBARD, THE HISTORY
OF PUBLIC LAND POLICIES, 305-09 (1965) [hereinafter HIBBARD].
24. 28 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 375, in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 123-
24 (H.S. Commager ed. 1942).
25. The Land Ordinance of 1785 has made an enduring contribution to public land law. It created
a system whereby lands were divided into square townships of 36 numbered sections, each section
containing 640 acres. Id. The ordinance provided for sale of land at public auction for a minimum
of one dollar an acre and for the reservation of Sixteenth Section lands within each township for
public education. 28 Journals of the Continental Congress 298 (1933). See G. COGINS AND C.
WILKINSON, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAWS 43-45 (1st ed. 1981).
26. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 also defined the process whereby territories could become
co-equal states. The Northwest Territory included the land south of Canada, north of the Ohio River,
east of the Mississippi River, and west of the original thirteen states. 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTrUTIONS
957 in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 128-32 (H.S. Commager ed. 1942). See COGGINs & G.
WILKINSON, supra note 25, at 43.
27. Ohio applied for admission in 1802 and was admitted in 1803. The Ohio enabling act provided
that "the section, number sixteen, in every township, and where such section has been sold, granted
or disposed of, other lands equivalent thereto, and most contiguous to the same, shall be granted
to the inhabitants of such township, for the use of schools." Ohio Enabling Act, 2 Stat. 173, 175,
ch. XL, § 7 (1802).
Ohio originally refused to accept Congress's terms which required Ohio to exempt taxation on
all property sold by the government for five years after the date of sale, unless Congress consented
to reserving school lands in Connecticut, Virginia, the United States military reserves, and Indian
territory. H. HIBBARD, supra note 23, at 310. In 1803, Congress modified the Ohio grant providing
that the school land endowments "'be vested in the legislature of that state' and not in the particular
township." Id. The proceeds, however, were still to be appropriated to the particular township.
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practice was generally followed in the admission of every other state to
the Union, although specific provisions have varied.'
The language of educational land grants from 1803 to 1910, when New
Mexico and Arizona were admitted into the Union, illustrates a subtle
change in federal school endowment policy.29 The first land grants, includ-
ing grants to Ohio and Mississippi, were to the states for educational
purposes. The economic benefits of the grants were to be used in the
townships where such Sixteenth Section lands we're located. After 1844,
Congress vested title to the reserved school lands in the state without any
provision that the proceeds be used in any particular township. 0 It was
not until Colorado was admitted as a state in 1875 that Congress restricted
the sale of school reservations. 3 Finally, the 1910 Enabling Acts of New
Mexico and Arizona provided for Congress' continuing oversight role in
the disposition of school land grants.32
HISTORY OF THE MISSISSIPPI EDUCATIONAL LAND GRANTS
Mississippi became a state in 1817."3 While Mississippi was still a
territory, Congress provided that Sixteenth Section lands be reserved from
the sale and survey of her territorial lands. 4 Thus, when Mississippi
became a state, lands had already been reserved for educational purposes.
The 1817 Land Sales Act for Mississippi covered land not included in
the 1803 Act.3 It specifically required that "the section No. 16, in each
township ... shall be reserved for the support of schools therein .... "3
28. The Ohio statehood grant provisions were generally followed in the admission of Mississippi,
Louisiana, Indiana, Illinois, Alabama, Missouri, Michigan, Arkansas, Florida, and Iowa. G. COGGINS
& C. WILKINSON, supra note 25, at 45.
29. See generally, H. HIBARD, supra note 23, at 305-46.
30. Id. at 314-315. Until Mar. 3, 1945, when Florida was admitted into the union, Congress
granted to all the states, except Michigan, Indiana, and Alabama, school lands for the use of the
townships. Congress also vested the state legislatures with the power to appropriate to each township
monies raised from the townships. Id. at 315. In Indiana and Alabama, Congress granted the school
lands directly to the inhabitants of the townships. Indiana Enabling Act, ch. LVII, § 6, 3 Stat. 289,
290 (1816) and Alabama Enabling Act, ch. XLVII, §6, 3 Stat. 489, 491 (1819). In Michigan,
Congress granted Sixteenth Section lands to the state for the use of schools. Id. See Papasan II,
106 S.Ct. at 2936.
31. The Colorado Enabling Act required that school property be sold for at least $2.50 per acre.
All states admitted into the Union after 1875, except Utah, have some restrictions on the sale of
school allotments. H. HIBBARD, supra note 23, at 317.
32. New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act, ch. 310, §§ 10, 28; 36 Stat. 557,563-65,574-75 (1910).
33. Mississippi Enabling Act, ch. XXIII, 3 Stat. 348 (1817).
34. In 1798 Congress created the Mississippi Territory. Act of April 7, 1798, ch. XXVIII, I Stat.
549 (1798). Six years later, Congress provided for the sale and survey of Mississippi Territory lands.
The 1803 Land Sales Act excepted from sale "section number sixteen, which shall be reserved in
each township for the support of schools within the same..." 1803 Land Sales Act for Mississippi,
ch. XXVII, § 12; 2 Stat. 229, 233-34 (1803).
35. Papasan 1 at 2936.
36. 1817 Land Sales Act of Mississippi, ch. LXII, §3; 3 Stat. 375 (1817).
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The history of the Chickasaw Cession begins in 1832 when the United
States and the Chickasaw Nation entered into the Treaty of Pontotock
Creek.3" The Chickasaw Nation ceded the northern 23 counties38 of Mis-
sissippi pursuant to an agreement that the lands be surveyed and sold at
an agreed upon "Government minimum price." 39 The state was to retain
the proceeds of such sales for the use and benefit of the Chickasaw Indian
Tribe.' Soon after the Treaty's ratification on March 1, 1833, the land
was advertised and quickly sold as buyers took advantage of the inex-
pensive land.4' Apparently as a result of the rapidity of the land sales,
no Sixteenth Section lands were reserved in the Chickasaw Cession area
as required by the terms of the Treaty.42 In order to correct this deficiency,
the United States gave land to the state in lieu of the Sixteenth Section
lands sold in the Chickasaw Cession lands.43 Congress vested title to these
lieu lands "in the State of Mississippi, for the use of schools within
[Chickasaw Cession counties] in said State. . .. "44
Mississippi accepted the Chickasaw Cession lieu lands in 1844* and
authorized their 99-year lease, renewable forever, at a price not less than
six dollars per acre.' The proceeds from the lease were "to be held in
trust by said state for the use of schools in the Chickasaw cession . ... 
37. The Treaty provided that land be sold "in the same manner and on the same terms... as
other public lands ..... Treaty with the Chickasaws (commonly referred to as Treaty at Pontotock
Creek), art. VIII, 7 Stat. 381, 382 (1832).
38. Id. at art. 1, 382. The 23 Mississippi counties include: Alcorn, Benton, Calhoun, Chickasaw,
Clay, Coahoma, DeSoto, Itawamba, Lafayette, Lee, Marshall, Monroe, Panola, Pontotoc, Prentiss,
Quitman, Tate, Tippah, Tishomingo, Tunica, Union, Webster and Yalobusha counties. Papasan I,
756 F.2d at 1090 n. 7. Both the Appellate Court and the U.S. Supreme Court cite 23 Chickasaw
Cession counties. A special report prepared by Mississippi's Secretary of State Dick Molpus and
State Auditor Ray Mabus cites 24 counties. The additional county is Tallahatchie. STATE AUDITOR
AND SECRETARY OF STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, SPECIAL REPORT ON CHICKASAW CESSION SCHOOL DISTRICTS
(Nov. 1984) in Joint App. at 35 [hereinafter SPECIAL REPORT].
39. Treaty with the Chickasaws (commonly referred to as Treaty at Pontotock Creek), art. VIII,
7 Stat. 381, 384 (1932). The total amount of land ceded from the Chickasaw Nation was 6,283,804
acres. The amount of Section Sixteen lands totaled 174,555 acres. SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 38,
at 36.
40. Treaty at Pontotock Creek, art. XI, 7 Stat. 381, 385 (1832).
41. SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 38, at 36.
42. Id.,
43. Chickasaw Lieu Lands Act, ch. CCCLV, 5 Stat. 116 (1836); see Lambert v. State, 211 Miss.
129, 137, 51 So.2d 201, 203 (1951). Congress authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to select
lands in lieu of Sixteenth Section lands that were subject to prior claims. Act of April 21, 1806, ch.
XLVI, §6; 2 Stat. 400, 401: Papasan 1, 756 F.2d at 1090, n 5; see generally Andrus v. Utah, 446
U.S. 500, 524-28 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (providing a historical overview of school indemnity
or lieu land selections).
44. Chickasaw Lieu Lands Act, ch. CCCLV, § 2, 5 Stat. 116 (1836). This Act also provides that
lieu lands "shall be holden by the same tenure, and upon the same terms and conditions, in all
respects, as [Mississippi] now holds the lands heretofore reserved for the use of schools in [Mis-
sissippi]." Id..
45. 1844 Miss. Laws 238, ch. LXVII.
46. 1848 Miss. Laws 62, ch. III, §§2, 3.
47. Id. at §5.
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With congressional authority,4' Mississippi sold these lands for approx-
imately $1,047,330 in 1856.' 9 Mississippi then invested the monies received
from the sale at an eight percent interest rate in the railroad companies,
with investment proceeds to be paid to the counties in the Chickasaw
Cession on a per acre basis.'e Seven years later the Mississippi legislature
authorized railroads to pay their indebtedness directly into the state treas-
ury. As a result, the state treasury was obligated to disburse monies to
the Chickasaw Cession counties." During the Civil War the railroads
were destroyed, and the railroad companies subsequently defaulted on
their payments. Nevertheless, the Chickasaw Cession counties continued
to receive eight percent interest from the state treasury until 1890 when
the legislature unilaterally reduced the interest to six percent.52 This inter-
est is still appropriated annually." The amount received today by the
Chickasaw Cession counties averages 63 cents per pupil per year.' The
average amount received from the revenues of Sixteenth Section lands
in the rest of the state is about $75.34 per pupil." Thus, the disparity of
revenues received by the Chickasaw Cession counties from Sixteenth
Section lands compared to the rest of the state is substantial.56
48. Authorization of Sale of Lieu Lands, ch. XXXV, 10 Stat. 6 (1852). This Act required that
all proceeds from the sales of land within a particular township be appropriated to the use of schools
within that township.
49. Papasan H, 106 S.Ct. at 2937.
50. 1856 Miss. 141, ch. LVI, §§ 14, 15.
51. SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 38, at 37.
52. Miss. CoNsr. art. VIII, §212 (1890).
53. The amount of interest totals $62,191 and is disbursed semi-annually. SPECIAL REPORT, supra
note 38, at 37; 1984 Miss. Laws, ch. LXXXVll.
54. Papasan H, 106 S. Ct. at 2938.
55. Id. Powell's dissenting opinion refutes that the disparity is $75.34 versus $.63, claiming that
the Court of Appeals and the Petition for Certiorari cite the disparity as $31.25 versus $.80. Since
there is no published district court opinion it is difficult to determine how the Court of Appeals
arrived at its figures. Papasan 1, 756 F.2d at 1091. The U.S. Supreme Court majority opinion relied
on the calculations in the SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 38, at 44.
56. On a per acre basis, the Chickasaw Cession counties averaged 36 cents per acre compared
to the Sixteenth Section counties average of $42.00 per acre. SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 38, at
38. The annual proceeds from the Chickasaw Session lands from 1922 remain unchanged at $62,191.
The other Section Sixteen lands have increased 467 percent from the fiscal year 1977 to 1983. The
1983 fiscal year estimate of those lands totalled $27,811,604. Id. at 37. The report states that
$7,022,502 in additional funding is required to raise the level of monies available to the Chickasaw
counties to the average available to non-Chickasaw counties. id. at 38. This estimation is in addition
to the appropriations made by the Mississippi State Legislature while this case was pending in the
Court of Appeals in 1985. The legislature appropriated $1 million per year from 1985 to 1991. 1985
Miss. Laws 7, ch. XXIII.
In their dissenting opinion, Justices Powell, Burger, and Rehnquist refuted the petitioners' equal
protection claims that these disparities detrimentally affect the Chickasaw Cession counties. First,
the Justices note that the Chickasaw Cession counties are "scattered widely" in a statewide ranking
of school districts in terms of expenditures per pupil. Second, the Justices argue that the total receipts
for education from Sixteenth Section funds are insignificant. Sixteenth Section lands account for
only 1 1/2 percent of the overall school funding. Papasan H, 106 S.Ct. at 2950. The total amount
of receipts for Sixteenth Section lands totalled $16,272,925 in 1984-85. This amount was "dwarfed"
by income from state and federal funds of over $752 million. Id. at 2952.
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ANALYSIS
The federal grant to Mississippi requires that the state reserve the
Sixteenth Section in each township for the support of schools within that
township.5" The language of the federal grant may be interpreted in two
ways. The federal grant either transferred an absolute fee interest or it
created a fee simple interest in trust.5" Mississippi's legal obligations to
the school children and school officials of the Chickasaw Cession counties
will differ according to the interpretation adopted by the appellate court
on remand.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment may pro-
hibit a state from disproportionately distributing the benefits of state-held
assets. In Papasan v. Allain, petitioners claim that the present disparity
in the distribution of the benefits from the state's Sixteenth Section lands
denies petitioners the equal protection of the laws in violation of their
Fourteenth Amendment rights. Petitioners further claim that these actions
deny them "their rights to and interest in a minimally adequate level of
education, or reasonable opportunity therefore."'9 Thus, the petitioners'
claim challenges the constitutionality of the state's unequal distribution
of funds from Sixteenth Section lands."
The United States Supreme Court established the constitutional stan-
dard under the Equal Protection Clause for such actions in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez.6 The constitutional standard
is "whether the state action rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose
or interest." 62 Under Rodriguez, disparities in school financing among
school districts constitute an equal protection violation only if they are
not rationally related to a legitimate state interest.63
In Rodriguez, the Court found that the funding variations among school
districts in San Antonio, Texas, resulted from local control over local
property taxation.' Texas maintains a dual approach to financing its
schools. Texas schools receive financing from ad valorem taxes levied
by local school districts and from the state's Permanent and Available
School Funds Program.65 The court found that the state had a legitimate
state interest in maintaining a system which permitted and encouraged
local participation and control of each district's educational programs.'
Thus, the Court held that the state's interest in local control over local
57. 1817 Land Sales Act of Miss., ch. LXII, 3 Stat. 375.
58. Papasan !!, 106 S.Ct. at 2946 n. 18.
59. Joint App. at 21, Papasan il..
60. Papasan iI, 106 S.Ct. at 2945.
61. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
62. Id. at 56.
63. See Papasan !H, 106 S. Ct. at 2945.
64. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 47-49. See discussion supra note 17.
65. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 7.
66. Id. at 49.
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educational programs justified school funding variations among school
districts. The Texas school funding program, therefore, did not violate
the Constitution.67
The Supreme Court objected to the appellate court's application of
Rodriguez in this case because unlike Texas law, Mississippi law requires
that the "property held in trust" be allocated to the "school districts of
the township in which such sixteenth section lands may be located or to
which any sixteenth section lieu lands may belong. '"" It is Mississippi
state law, rather than local control, that results in unequal expenditures
of state resources among school districts.69 The issue, therefore, is not
whether Mississippi's public school financing program is rationally related
to a legitimate state interest, but whether Mississippi's Sixteenth Section
and lieu land funding program is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest.7'
Whether Mississippi's Sixteenth Section and lieu land funding program
is rationally related to a legitimate state interest depends on the property
interest conveyed to the state upon admission to the Union. If the federal
grant conveyed an absolute fee interest, the lands are owned by Missis-
sippi. Mississippi is not legally bound by the language of the grant to
disburse the proceeds of land grant money to any particular township or
school district. Mississippi, therefore, may not be able to justify the
disparate allocation of the economic benefits generated from Sixteenth
Section lands on the basis of a mandating and legitimate state interest.
On the other hand, if the federal grant created a trust and the state, as
trustee, is bound by the terms of that trust, the state has no choice but
to disburse all the proceeds received from any township to that particular
township.7 Under this interpretation of the grant, Mississippi is required
by federal law to allocate the economic benefits of the school lands to
particular townships. If the state is bound by the terms of the grant, then
there is a rational basis for the funding disparity. However, the land grant
may violate the Equal Protection Clause by requiring the state to dispro-
portionately allocate school funds among the school districts.
FEE SIMPLE ANALYSIS
The first interpretation of the federal land grants is that the state holds
67. Id. at 55.
68. Miss. CODE. ANN. § 29-3-109 (Supp. 1986).
69. Papasan HI, 106 S. Ct. at 2946.
70. The majority opinion distinguished Rodriguez stating that "Rodriguez did not ... purport
to validate all funding variations that might result from a State's public school funding decisions."
Id. at 2945.
71. Seeid. at 2946 n. 18.
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a fee simple interest in Sixteenth Section lands. Many of the earlier cases
support this conclusion. These cases are important because they interpret
land grants that are contemporaneous and similar in wording to Missis-
sippi's land grant.
In Cooper v. RobertsP (1856), the United States Supreme Court addressed
the issue of the nature of Michigan's right to Sixteenth Section lands.
Michigan's Enabling Act is similar to the Enabling Act of Mississippi.
It provided that "every section No. 16, in every township of the public
lands, and where such section has been sold or otherwise disposed of,
other lands equivalent thereto, and as contiguous as may be, shall be
granted to the State for the use of schools."' Michigan's interest in these
Sixteenth Section lands vested in the state at the time of the state's
admission into the Union.' The Court held that the compact between the
United States and Michigan created for Michigan an interest in Sixteenth
Section lands that is plenary and exclusive. The Court stated, "[in the
present instance, the grant is to the State directly, without limitation of
its power, though there is a sacred obligation imposed on its public
faith."75 In other words, the state has an honorary obligation to act
consistently with the terms of the grant, but the state is not legally bound.
Neither Congress nor the inhabitants of the state have any legal remedies
against the state if the state fails to act accordingly. Thus, the Court held
that the federal law granted a fee simple interest to the state in the Sixteenth
Section lands.
In 1914, the United States Supreme Court in Alabama v. Schmidt also
held that the Sixteenth Section land grants to Alabama vested a fee simple
interest in Alabama with a sacred, not legal, obligation imposed on its
public faith.76 Alabama's Enabling Act provided that Sixteenth Section
lands in every township "shall be granted to the inhabitants of such
township for the use of schools. "" Justice Holmes, delivering the opinion
of the Court, held that "these words vested the legal title in [Ala-
bama] .... "" The Federal Enabling Act conveyed a "gift" to the state.79
In turn, the state has an honorary obligation to the inhabitants of the
township.' But since the state's honorary obligation does not affect the
legal title, the state's control over the land is not legally limited by the
terms of the grant.
72. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 173 (1856).
73. Act of Congress of June 23, 1836, cited in Cooper 59 U.S. at 179.
74. Cooper, 59 U.S. at 179.
75. Id..
76. Alabama v. Schmidt, 232 U.S. 168, 173 (1914).
77. Act of March 2, 1819, ch. 47 §6, 3 Stat. 489, 491, cited in Alabama, 232 U.S. at 172.
78. Alabama, 232 U.S. at 172.
79. Id. at 173.
80. Id. at 173-74.
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Similarly, in Sloan v. Blytheville Special School District No. 5, the
Supreme Court of Arkansas interpreted the Enabling Act of Arkansas to
convey an absolute fee interest in Sixteenth Section lands to the state."'
The court held that the title to the land vested absolutely in the state under
the compact between the United States and Arkansas. 2 The court stated
that the trust reposed by the United States is a personal trust in the public
faith of Arkansas, and not a property trust fastened by the terms of the
grant upon the land itself."3 Thus, no limitations attach to the state's
power by the grant and, therefore, the legislature has exclusive control
over the funds. The only limitations upon the legislature would be state,
and not federal, constitutional provisions and laws.
Because of the similarities in the language of these grants to the Mis-
sissippi grant, the court of appeals may adopt the holding of these cases
and find that Mississippi's interest in the Sixteenth Section lands is plen-
ary. If the court of appeals adopts this holding, then the grant may not
provide Mississippi a rational basis for disproportionately disbursing school
funds. Mississippi would have no legal obligation to disburse the revenues
generated from a particular township to that township. Thus, although
Mississippi allocates the revenues generated from the districts in non-
Chickasaw Cession counties to those particular districts as provided in
the grant, Mississippi may not be required by federal law to do so.
Mississippi would be fulfilling its "honorary obligation" to the inhabitants
of that township, but there would be no legal requirement.
In fact, by allocating benefits according to township lines, Mississippi
may violate the Equal Protection Clause. The court may find that the
variations between the benefits received by the Chickasaw Cession school
districts and non-Chickasaw Cession school districts are not rationally
related to a legitimate state interest. Mississippi, therefore, may violate
the Equal Protection Clause because the Sixteenth Section school funding
program which requires such distribution is not rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.
The court still could find that fulfilling an "honorary obligation" is
rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Courts which hold that the
federal grants conveyed a fee simple interest assert that the state's obli-
gation is "sacred" or "honorary." Both terms impose a duty upon the
state to act according to the provisions of the grant even though the state
has no legal duty to act accordingly. If this reasoning is adopted, then
the court may find that Mississippi's school disbursement structure is
rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Under this analysis, the
81. Sloan v. Blytheville Special School Dist. No. 5., 169 Ark. 77, 273 S.W. 397, 400 (1925).
82. Id..
83. d. at 399.
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state of Mississippi would not have violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
TRUST ANALYSIS
The second interpretation of the federal land grant is that the grant
conveyed to the state a fee simple interest in trust designating the state
as trustee. A review of more recent land grants shows that the cases
interpreted those grants as conveying a trust in the state. For example,
the courts interpreted the land grants to Arizona and New Mexico to
convey a trust with Congress maintaining a continuing oversight role to
ensure that the states abide by the provisions of the grants." Similarly,
Mississippi courts have interpreted the Mississippi Enabling Act to convey
a trust.
However, Mississippi's interests in Sixteenth Section lands derives
from the federal grants.8 5 Therefore, the validity and the extent of the
state's interests is a federal question. 6 Even though resolution of this
issue is a federal question, the appellate court may look to Mississippi
law and Mississippi's interpretation of the school land grant. 7
A review of Mississippi's interpretation is significant because the Ena-
bling Act of 1817 is a compact between the United States and Missis-
sippi.8" Before Mississippi became a state, it had to pass legislation
accepting the terms of the Enabling Act. 9 The Enabling Act of Mississippi
authorized the inhabitants of the western part of the Mississippi territory
to form a constitution and state government provided that it was "not
repugnant" to the principles of the Northwest Ordinance of 17 87 ,° which
provided for the reservation of Sixteenth Section lands in each township
for the use of schools.9 The principles of the Northwest Ordinance were
extended to the Mississippi territory in the Act of Cession by the state
of Georgia in 1802.92 Therefore, a court may place significant weight on
how the state interpreted the compact.
84. Alamo Land and Cattle v. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295, 301 (1976); Lassen v. Arizona Highway
Dep't., 385 U.S. 458, 460 (1966); Ervien, Comm'r of Public Lands of the State of New Mexico
v. United States, 251 U.S. 41, 48 (1919).
85. Papasan H, 106 S.Ct. at 2946 n. 18.
86. "The question as to the extent of this federal grant, that is, as to the limit of the land conveyed
... is necessarily a federal question. It is a question which concerns the validity and effect of an
act done by the United States; it involves the ascertainment of the essential basis of a right asserted
under federal law." California ex rel. State Lands Comm'n v. United States, 457 U.S. 273, 279
(1982), quoting Borax Consol., Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 22 (1935).
87. Id..
88. See United States v. Morrison, 240 U.S. 192, 201-2 (1915); Cooper, 59 U.S. at 177-179.
89. See Ervien, 251 U.S. at 46.
90. Mississippi Enabling Act, ch. XXIII, §4, 3 Stat. 348, 349 (1817).
91. 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CoNsTrruroN, supra note 26.
92. 3 Stat. 348, 349.
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Mississippi courts and the Mississippi legislature consistently interpret
the Sixteenth Section land grants to be reserved for the inhabitants of the
township in which those lands are located. A Mississippi statute provides
that "Sixteenth section school lands, or lands granted in lieu thereof,
constitute property held in trust for the benefit of the public schools and
must be treated as such." 93 Mississippi courts, however, initially debated
over the interpretation of the land grants. Two important Mississippi
Supreme Court decisions discussing the property interests conveyed to
Mississippi are Hester v. Crisler,9' which was decided in 1859, and Jones
v. Madison County,95 which overruled Hester in 1895.
In Hester v. Crisler, the court addressed the issue of whether a lease
of Sixteenth Section lands was void because the trustees failed to obtain
the consent of the inhabitants of that township. The court held that Mis-
sissippi had no property interests in Sixteenth Section lands until the Act
of May 19, 1852 was passed by the United States Congress." The 1852
Congressional Act authorized Mississippi to sell or lease lands reserved
for educational purposes, provided that such lands were not conveyed
without the consent of the inhabitants of the township. 97
The court interpreted the 1852 statute as ratifying and approving all
sales of educational reserved lands previously made by the state not-
withstanding the state's failure to obtain consent of the inhabitants of the
township. Because the 1852 Act ratified all state approved sales, the court
reasoned that the Act could not have intended that the inhabitants' assent
be prerequisite to sales before implementation of the statute." Thus, the
court found that the United States government retained legal title to
Sixteenth Sections Lands until the passage of the Act of 1852. 99
The Hester court stated that whatever may have been Congress's intent
in passing the Land Sales Act of 1803, which reserved Sixteenth Section
lands from sale in Mississippi Territory,"° no power was conferred upon
either the state, the township, or the trustees to carry into effect the
purposes of that Act until the Act of May 19, 1852. ' Further, the court
concluded that a trust could not have been created by the Act of 1803
because neither a trustee nor the cestui que trust were in existence. 02
In 1895, the Mississippi Supreme Court overruled the Hester case. The
93. Miss. CoDE ANN. § 29-3-1 (Supp. 1986).
94. 36 Miss. 681 (1859).
95. 72 Miss. 777, 18 So. 87, 90 (1895).
96. Hester, 36 Miss. at 683.
97. Act of May 19, 1852, ch. XXXV, 10 Stat. 6.
98. Hester, 36 Miss. at 683.
99. See Jones, 18 So. at 90.
100. See supra note 36.
101. Id. at 90.
102. Id. The trustee did not exist because Mississippi did not become a state until 1817. Id..
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court in Jones v. Madison Co. held that title to Sixteenth Section land
passed to Mississippi by virtue of the Act of Cession by the state of
Georgia in 1802."03 In reviewing Hester, the Jones court first held that
Hester misinterpreted the 1852 Act. It stated that Hester ignored the
express language of the act which required the consent of the inhabitants
before the state could dispose of any Sixteenth Section lands."o' Second,
the Jones court held that the right of the inhabitants of the townships to
Sixteenth Section lands arose not from the 1852 Act, but from the Act
of Cession by the state of Georgia in 1802."'5 Thus, it was by virtue of
the compact between Mississippi and the United States that title passed
to the state when the lands were surveyed."m
The Jones court did not address the issue of whether title to educational
lands passed to Mississippi in fee simple or in trust. However, it stated
that because of the Act of Cession by the state of Georgia in 1802, the
state, and not the United States, was the donor of Sixteenth Section lands.
The court stated that "the United States never had any shadow of a right
to these lands, save as trustee for the inhabitants of the prospective states
which the act itself stipulated should be created."° 7
The court also favorably quoted Long & Long v. Brown"m to support
its holding that title passed when Mississippi became a state. In inter-
preting the Alabama Enabling Act of March 2, 1819, the Long court held
that "the grant of sixteenth sections is in perpetuity to the inhabitants of
the respective townships-that the legal title to the land is in the State,
in trust for the inhabitants of the respective townships in which the land
is situated. . . .""
Later Mississippi court decisions specifically hold that the lands are
owned by the state in trust for the inhabitants of the townships in which
the Sixteenth Section lands are located. For example, in Keys v. Carter"o
103. Jones, 18 So. at 90. The Mississippi lands in question formed part of the territory included
in the cession made by the state of Georgia to the United States in 1802. Article V of the compact
provided that the territory ceded would form a state and be admitted on equal footing into the Union
as soon as it contained sixty thousand free inhabitants or when Congress thought expedient. Id..
104. Id. at 89.
105. Id. at 90.
106. Id. at 92. On Apr. 24, 1802, the state of Georgia was ceded from the United States certain
land out of which the state of Mississippi was later formed. The Act provided that the territory would
form a state and be admitted into the union when it could claim 60,000 free inhabitants and that it
would be admitted with the same privileges, and in the same manner, as provided in the 1787
ordinance of Congress. Id. at 88. By the Congressional Act of Mar. 3, 1803, providing for the
survey and sale of public lands in the territory, all Sixteen Sections were "reserved in each township
for the support of schools within the same .... " 1803 Land Sales Act for Mississippi, ch. XXVll,
§ 12, 2 Stat. 229.
107. Jones, 18 So. at 90.
108. 4 Ala. 622 (1843).
109. id. at 631 (emphasis added).
110. 318 So.2d 862 (Miss. 1875).
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in 1975, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that Sixteenth Section lands
"constitute property held in trust for the public schools. . . .'"" Simi-
larly, the Mississippi Supreme Court in Holmes v. Jones"2 and Tally v.
Carter"3 held that Sixteenth Section school lands are trust lands to be
administered by the state for the support of the public schools therein." 4
Mississippi's interpretation of the land grants creating a trust in the
state is supported by recent United States Supreme Court decisions, which
find that the states hold the lands in trust for the beneficiaries for which
the lands were granted. This interpretation assumes that the United States
has a continuing interest in the administration of the funds from the land
grants; the states do not have a choice in how they allocate such funds.
Thus, a grant to Mississippi creating a trust would require the state as
trustee to reserve the Sixteenth Section in each township for the support
of schools within that township.
An important United States Supreme Court case which holds that the
state is a trustee for the school lands is Ervien v. United States.'", The
New Mexico Enabling Act provided that the lands granted:
IS]hall be by the said State held in trust, to be disposed of in whole
or in part only in a manner as herein provided and for the several
objects specified in the respective granting and confirmatory provi-
sions, and that the natural products and money proceeds of any of
said lands shall be subject to the same trusts as the lands producing
the same. "1
6
The court interpreted the Enabling Act to enumerate specific purposes
for which the lands were granted. The state, therefore, is limited by the
terms of the grant in administering funds to the beneficiaries. Further,
the United States, as the grantor of the lands, has the right to exact the
performance of the conditions of the grant.
In Ervien, the court held that the state of New Mexico could not use
funds from Sixteenth Section lands to advertise these lands for sale. The
Court specifically denied New Mexico's right as a private proprietor of
the lands to advertise even if the advertisements might be to the trust's
advantage. Such advertisements were too speculative and not within the
enumerated purposes of the trust."'
11l. Id. at 864.
112. 318 So.2d 865 (Miss. 1975).
113. 318 So.2d 835 (Miss. 1975).
114. Holmes, 318 So.2d at 868; Tally, 318 So.2d at 838. See also City of Corinth v. Robertson,
87 So. 464 (1921).
115. Ervien, 251 U.S. at 41.
116. Enabling Act of New Mexico, ch. 310, 36 Stat. 557, 563 (1912).
117. Under this analysis, Mississippi's investments into the railroad company may be viewed as
an act beyond the scope of the purposes of the trust. However, Mississippi cannot be held to have
breached the trust because the United States Supreme Court held in Papasan H that the petitioner's
breach of trust claim is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
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In 1967, the United States Supreme Court again interpreted the New
Mexico and Arizona Enabling Acts with respect to federal grants to the
states in Lassen v. Arizona.'"8 The court held that the purpose of the grants
was to produce a fund with which the state could support its public
schools. "9 Both Acts placed restrictions on the states to prevent abuses
by the states and to insure that the trust received appropriate compensation
for the trust lands. 20 The court stated, "[t]he Enabling Act unequivocally
demands both that the trust receive the full value of any lands transferred
from it and that any funds received be employed only for the purposes
for which the land was given."'' Because the states must act according
to the terms of the trust, the states must create separate trust accounts for
each of the designated beneficiaries. Monies cannot be transferred between
accounts.
If the Court of Appeals finds that the Mississippi Enabling Act created
a trust, then Mississippi is bound by the terms of the trust. Mississippi
is required by the terms of the trust to disburse the proceeds raised from
Sixteenth Section or lieu lands to the public schools where those lands
are located. Under this analysis, Mississippi has a rational basis for
disproportionately distributing Sixteenth Section land grant funds among
its school districts. Thus, Mississippi's disbursement structure would not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause.'22
It is possible, however, that the federal grant violate the Equal Pro-
tection Clause under the Fifth Amendment. Assuming that the Court of
Appeals finds that Mississippi is a trustee, and that decision is upheld by
the Supreme Court, petitioners may file a new claim challenging the
constitutionality of the federal land grants. The claim might state that the
federal land grants violate the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution because
they require the state as trustee to allot to the Chickasaw Cession counties
disproportionate school appropriations. However, in Rodriguez, inherent
differences in land values coupled with the differences in local control
mechanisms provided a permissible rational basis for the variances in
educational funding. If the court applies this reasoning to the Sixteenth
Section federal land grant, the differences in land values may justify the
federal allotments despite the unequal funding results. Therefore, if the
court applies the Rodriguez rational basis standard of review to a Fifth
Amendment challenge, the federal grant would be found constitutional.
CONCLUSION
Papasan v. Allain illustrates that the terms of federal land grants are
118. Lassen, 385 U.S. at 458.
119. Id. at 463.
120. Id. at 464.
121. Id. at 466.
122. Under this analysis, Mississippi would not be held liable for any breach-of-trust claim in
federal court because of the Eleventh Amendment.
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still unsettled. On remand, the court of appeals must interpret a federal
educational land grant enacted by Congress over one hundred and fifty
years ago. The court's findings will affect the school children in Missis-
sippi. If the court finds that the grant vested a fee simple interest in
Mississippi, then Mississippi may be required to restructure its school
financing. The children of the Chickasaw Cession then should be guar-
anteed an equal distribution of revenues generated from Sixteenth Section
lands. That should increase overall the monies they receive for education.
Such a holding may also instigate further litigation in other states with
similar land grants. However, if the court finds that the grant conveyed
a trust or otherwise finds that the state had a rational basis for the funding
disparity, the state's actions would not violate the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs may still have a claim against
the Federal government for violating the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.
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